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ABSTRACT 
Deidentification is one method for protecting privacy while 
permitting other uses of personal information.  However, 
deidentified data is often still capable of being reidentified.  The 
main purpose of this article is to offer a legislative-based 
contractual solution for the sharing of deidentified personal 
information while providing protections for privacy.  The 
legislative framework allows a data discloser and a data recipient 
to enter into a voluntary contract that defines responsibilities and 
offers remedies to aggrieved individuals. 
INTRODUCTION 
The goal of protecting the privacy interests of individuals often 
conflicts with ever-increasing demands for use of personal data to 
achieve potentially beneficial objectives in public health, law 
 
A PDF version of this Note is available online at http://iplj.net/blog/archives/ 
volumexxi/book1.  Visit http://iplj.net/blog/archives for access to the IPLJ archive. 
* Privacy and Information Policy Consultant, Washington, D.C.  The author is 
grateful to Steven Cope, Latanya Sweeney, Peter Winn, Mark Rothstein, Susan Landau, 
and Joel Reidenberg for their comments and assistance with this article. 
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enforcement, national security, anti-terrorism, fraud prevention, 
and research in different fields of study.1  Conflicts over privacy 
can be reduced, moderated, and balanced in various ways. 
Deidentification—the removal of identifiers from personal 
information used or disclosed for purposes unrelated to the purpose 
for which the information was originally obtained2—is one method 
for protecting privacy while permitting other uses of personal 
information.3  However, deidentification does not always make 
reidentification of individuals impossible.4  Reidentification is the 
linkage of deidentified personal information with an overt 
identifier which belongs or is assigned to a living or dead 
individual.5 
This article begins with the premise that statistical, encryption, 
or other mathematical approaches to deidentification aimed at 
protecting privacy6 fail to provide solutions to address all data 
types and data sharing activities.7  These approaches still have 
value because they provide some degree of privacy protection, but 
they seldom achieve complete deidentification of data.8  No matter 
how many identifiers have been removed or encrypted and no 
matter how much data has been coded or masked, the remaining 
 
 1 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010) (“Data can be either useful or 
perfectly anonymous but never both.”). 
 2 See Re-identification, ELEC. INFO. PRIVACY CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/ 
reidentification/#intro (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
 3 See id. 
 4 See id. 
 5 See id. 
 6 Latanya Sweeney, Lab. for Computer Sci., Mass. Inst. of Tech., Roundtable 
Discussion: Identifiability of Data at Subcomm. on Privacy & Confidentiality, Nat’l 
Comm. on Vital & Health Statistics (Jan. 28, 1998), [hereinafter Sweeny, Subcomm.], 
available at http://ncvhs.hhs.gov/980128tr.htm.  The National Committee on Vital and 
Health Statistics is an advisory committee to the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services. Id. 
 7 See Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Myths and Fallacies of “Personally 
Identifiable Information,” 53 COMMC’N ACM 24, 26 (June 2010), available at 
http://userweb.cs.utexas.edu/users/shmat/shmat_cacm10.pdf. 
 8 See id. 
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data may still be reidentified.9  Further, the value of data for 
legitimate uses, such as research, may be significantly reduced 
when the data is processed without identifiers which were removed 
to protect privacy.10  In the absence of a technical solution to 
reidentification, other approaches are needed. 
The solution presented here focuses on controlling 
reidentification and providing accountability for those who 
promise not to reidentify information.  This article offers a 
legislative-based contractual solution for the sharing of 
deidentified personal information while providing protections for 
privacy.  This legislative framework allows a data discloser and a 
data recipient to enter into a voluntary contract that defines 
responsibilities and offers remedies to aggrieved individuals.  
Additionally, this legislative approach offers (a) common 
standards, (b) protections for the data subjects which are likely 
never to appear in private contracts, (c) a framework that can be 
incorporated by reference in regulations, and (d) a safe harbor 
provision for some activities of reidentification.  The proposed 
contractual solution can be useful whether personal information is 
deidentified in support of academic research or other objectives.  
This proposal is not a universal guarantee of privacy, nor will it 
work for all data exchanges.  It will, however, provide another tool 
to support the sharing of personal data while addressing the 
privacy interests of the data subjects. 
In this article, deidentification means that personal information 
has been processed in some fashion to reduce the ability to identify 
the individuals to whom the data refer.  It does not mean that 
information has been anonymized to the point where 
reidentification is never possible. 
 
 9 See id. (“It turns out there is a wide spectrum of human characteristics that enable 
re-identification: consumption preferences, commercial transactions, Web browsing, 
search histories, and so forth.”); see also Ohm, supra note 1, at 1704–05. 
 10 See Ohm, supra note 1, at 1753.  “[E]ven modest privacy gains require almost 
complete destruction of the data-mining utility.” Id. (quoting Justin Brickell & Vitaly 
Shmatikov, The Cost of Privacy: Destruction of Data-Mining Utility in Anonymized Data 
Publishing, The 14th ACM SIGKDD Int’l Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data 
Mining 70, 70, 76 (August 2008)). 
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I. THE PROBLEM 
A major challenge for deidentification is the vast amount of 
personal information available from public and private sources in 
the United States and, increasingly, elsewhere around the world.11  
The more personal data that is available, the easier it can be to link 
deidentified data to a particular individual.12  The commercial 
collection, compilation, and exploitation of personal data in the 
United States are extensive.13  Sources of personal information 
include public records (e.g., voter registers, occupational licenses, 
property ownership and tax records, court records), commercial 
data (e.g., transaction information), and even nonidentifiable data 
(e.g., census data).14  Extensive profiles of individuals and 
households exist in commercial records that may include the name, 
address, former addresses, and telephone number of a referenced 
individual as well as information pertaining to her educational 
level, home ownership, mail order buying propensity, credit card 
usage, income level, marital status, age, children, and lifestyle 
(including personal interests in activities such as gardening or 
sports).15  Private Internet companies increasingly maintain health 
records outside the reach of health privacy laws that only protect 
health records held by health care providers and insurers.16  
Internet websites, including social networking sites, are recent new 
facilities that provide additional sources of personal information, 
 
 11 See Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 7, at 24. 
 12 See Latanya Sweeney, Achieving k-Anonymity Privacy Protection Using 
Generalization and Suppression, 10(5) INT’L J. ON UNCERTAINTY, FUZZINESS & 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED SYS. 571, 588 (2002) [hereinafter Sweeney, Achieving k-Anonymity], 
available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.58.7384&rep 
=rep1&type=pdf (discussing how the increase in publically available information on the 
internet has created the ability to build an “electronic fingerprint”). 
 13 See Latanya Sweeney, Information Explosion, in CONFIDENTIALITY, DISCLOSURE, 
AND DATA ACCESS: THEORY AND PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS FOR STATISTICAL AGENCIES 
43, 43 (P. Doyle et al. eds., Urban Inst. 2001). 
 14 See Latanya Sweeney, Computational Disclosure Control 110 (Jan. 8, 2001) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Mass. Inst. of Tech.), http://groups.csail.mit. 
edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/privacy/sweeney-thesis-draft.pdf [hereinafter Sweeney, 
CDC]. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See Robert Gellman, Personal Health Records: Why Many PHRs Threaten Privacy, 
WORLD PRIVACY FORUM (Feb. 20, 2008), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/ 
pdf/WPF_PHR_02_20_2008fs.pdf. 
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including search requests, movies watched, and other activities and 
interests.17  Cellular telephones now track the location of users at 
all times.18  So-called “digital signage” tracks individuals in public 
spaces, collecting detailed information about consumers’ behavior 
and their characteristics, like age, gender, and ethnicity.19 
Personal information that no longer contains overt identifiers 
(name, identification number, e-mail address, telephone number) 
can still be linked with known individuals.  Identity can be 
ascertained from simple, basic, widely available non-unique 
identifiers (sometimes called quasi-identifiers).20  For example, 
Professor Latanya Sweeney, a leading academic authority on 
statistics, identification, and policy, estimates that 87% of 
Americans can be uniquely identified from their date of birth, 
gender, and five-digit zip code.21  Removing, generalizing, or 
coding these or other non-unique identifiers may make the task of 
reidentification harder, but the data may still be reidentified.22  At 
the same time, deidentified data sets may be less useful for 
research and other uses because of the difficulty of linking data 
sets or because the data will no longer support complete or precise 
conclusions.23 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(“HIPAA”), a federal health privacy statute, provides an example 
of the difficulty of achieving—or even defining—
 
 17 See, e.g., J.R. Raphael, People Search Engines: They Know Your Dark Secrets . . . 
And Tell Anyone, PC WORLD (Mar. 10, 2009, 11:30 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/ 
article/161018/people_search_engines_they_know_your_dark_secretsand_tell_anyone. 
html. 
 18 See April A. Otterberg, GPS Tracking Technology, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661, 662 (2005) 
(discussing the privacy implications of GPS tracking). 
 19 See Pam Dixon, The One-Way-Mirror Society: Privacy Implications of the New 
Digital Signage Networks, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM (Jan. 27, 2010), http://www. 
worldprivacyforum.org/pdf/onewaymirrorsocietyfs.pdf. 
 20 See R. Motwani & Y. Xu, Efficient Algorithms for Masking and Finding Quasi-
Identifiers, Very Large Data Bases (VLDB) Conference, Vienna, Austria (2007). 
 21 Sweeney, CDC, supra note 14, at 20. 
 22 See id. at 203 (discussing how the Scrubs Method of de-anonymizing data cannot 
guarantee that data will not be reidentified). 
 23 See Sweeney, Achieving k-Anonymity, supra note 12, at 573 (explaining that 
information, though de-identified, must remain practically useful as research material). 
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deidentification.24  HIPAA’s privacy rule provides that 
individually identifiable health information is deidentified if 
seventeen specific fields of data are removed or generalized.25  The 
rule assumed that deidentification by this method would provide 
complete anonymity to the individuals concerned.  Data that is 
deidentified according to this standard falls outside the rule’s 
scope, and the rule allows the data to be freely disclosed to anyone 
or to be published.26 
However, notwithstanding HIPAA’s determination that the 
resulting data is deidentified, Professor Sweeney testified that there 
is a 0.04% chance that data deidentified under the health Act’s 
methodology could be reidentified when the deidentified data was 
compared to voter registration records for a confined population.27  
Thus, if a database deidentified under HIPAA standards had one 
million names, then four hundred people could likely be 
reidentified.  If other public, commercially available, Internet-
based, or private records were also to be consulted, the chances of 
reidentification would almost certainly increase.  HIPAA’s 
deidentification process may be the most specific and detailed 
regulatory approach to deidentification.  Yet, even HIPAA’s 
extensive and carefully considered efforts at deidentification do not 
achieve complete anonymity for all data. 
Other examples in which information was reidentified after it 
was processed to protect privacy information can be readily found.  
 
 24 See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 
(2006).  HIPAA rules cover both privacy and security. See HHS Security and Privacy 
Rule, 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2) (2010) (detailing the requirements relating to use and 
disclosure of health information). 
 25 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2010).  The rule has an eighteenth, catch-all, field 
covering “[a]ny other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.” Id. § 
164.514(b)(2)(i)(R).  In addition to removing the specified identifiers, the entity making 
the disclosure cannot have actual knowledge that the information “could be used alone or 
in combination with other information to identify an individual who is a subject of the 
information.” Id. § 164.514(b)(2)(ii) (2010). 
 26 See NAT’L COMM. ON VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., ENHANCED PROTECTIONS FOR USES OF HEALTH DATA: A STEWARDSHIP 
FRAMEWORK FOR “SECONDARY USES” OF ELECTRONICALLY COLLECTED AND 
TRANSMITTED HEALTH DATA 36 (2007), available at http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/ 
071221lt.pdf. 
 27 Id. at 36 n.16. 
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Professors Krish Muralidhar and Rathindra Sarathy provide a case 
study using educational performance data publicly released by 
states under federal rules.28  The disclosures are supposed to 
comply with a requirement in the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act of 1974 (“FERPA”) that the disclosure of identifiable 
student data requires written parental consent.29  Muralidhar and 
Sarathy show that even when the release of aggregate data  
satisfies standards for minimum cell sizes, the remaining data can 
still allow for the computation of personally identifiable 
information about particular subgroups and about individuals.30 
A June 2010 article by Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly 
Shmatikov noted the shortcomings of deidentification and offered 
a broad and general conclusion: “[t]he emergence of powerful re-
identification algorithms demonstrates not just a flaw in a specific 
anonymization technique(s), but the fundamental inadequacy of the 
entire privacy protection paradigm based on ‘de-identifying’ the 
data.”31 
Professor Paul Ohm suggests that “[u]ntil a decade ago, the 
robust anonymization assumption worked well for everybody 
involved.”32  He provides additional examples of several well-
publicized releases of supposedly deidentified data that were 
ultimately found to be identifiable, including the America Online 
release of research data search queries and the Netflix release of a 
prize data study that contained 100 million movie ratings by 
Netflix customers.33 
Indeed, there may not be a realistic and practical standard for 
absolute deidentification in today’s data rich world.  Professor 
Sweeney put it this way: “I can never guarantee that any release of 
[deidentified] data is anonymous, even though for a particular user 
 
 28 Krish Muralidhar & Rathindra Sarathy, PRIVACY VIOLATIONS IN ACCOUNTABILITY 
DATA RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC BY STATE EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES 1 (2009), available at 
http://gatton.uky.edu/faculty/muralidhar/EdPrivacyViolation.pdf. 
 29 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b) (2006). 
 30 See Muralidhar & Sarathy, supra note 28, at 7–20. 
 31 Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 7, at 26.  
 32 Ohm, supra note 1, at 1716. 
 33 Id. at 1720–24. 
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it may very well be anonymous.”34  As a general proposition, for 
most personal data, deidentification may be like absolute zero for 
temperature: a state that can be approached but never achieved.  
Even if data could be fully deidentified, the prize may not be worth 
the effort in many cases.  The data may no longer have significant 
value for researchers and other users.35 
From a policy perspective, identifiability of personal 
information is best viewed as a continuum.  At one end of the 
continuum, information is fully identifiable due to the presence of 
names, identification numbers, and the like.  Shedding overt 
identifiers moves data down the continuum where it becomes 
harder to link the data with individuals, but data may still be 
identifiable even with all overt identifiers removed.  While it may 
be possible at times to achieve provably absolute deidentification 
using encryption, coding, hashing, and other techniques,36 it seems 
highly unlikely that there is a general solution that will work for all 
types of data, all types of users, and all types of activities.  Thus, 
we continue to face the possibility that deidentified personal data 
shared for research and other purposes may be subject to 
reidentification. 
II. EXISTING LEGAL APPROACHES 
Statisticians have long been aware of deidentification issues 
and have developed many techniques to address the possibility of 
reidentification.37  However, existing laws do little to untangle the 
deidentification dilemma.  Indeed, they tend to make it worse.  
Existing laws often reflect an assumption that identifiability is a 
binary state; personal data is either identifiable or it is not.  These 
 
 34 See Sweeney, Subcomm., supra note 6. 
 35 See Ohm, supra note 1, at 1704. 
 36 See Sweeney, Subcomm., supra note 6. 
 37 See, e.g., Fed. Comm. on Statistical Methodology, Report on Statistical Disclosure 
Limitation Methodology 12–28 (Statistical Policy Working Paper No. 22, 2005), 
available at http://www.fcsm.gov/working-papers/spwp22.html (discussing sampling, 
suppression random rounding, and swapping as examples of methods for 
deidentification); Khaled El Emam, Heuristics for De-identifying Health Data, 6 IEEE 
SEC. & PRIVACY 58–61 (2008) (discussing heuristics that are used and how they can be 
applied). 
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laws tend to ignore the reidentification issue altogether, 
establishing vague or inconsistent standards for identifiability.  
Some examples: 
 The Privacy Act of 1974,38 a U.S. law that 
applies mostly to federal agencies, defines 
“record” as a grouping of information about an 
individual that contains “his name, or the 
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying 
particular assigned to the individual, such as a 
finger or voice print or a photograph.”39 An 
identifier is an essential part of a record.40  The 
ability to infer identity or to reidentify a record 
is not sufficient or relevant, no matter how easy 
it may be to accomplish the reidentification.  
Further, the law treats a fingerprint as an 
identifier,41 when few people without access to a 
law enforcement fingerprint database could 
identify an individual from a fingerprint.  The 
Act’s concept of identifiability is muddled, at 
best. 
 
 The Cable Communications Policy Act does not 
define “personally identifiable information,” but 
it excludes from the term “any record of 
aggregate data which does not identify 
particular persons.”42  However, even aggregate 
data can be used to reidentify individuals in 
some circumstances.43  The statute does not 
address that possibility. 
 
 
 38 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(4) (referring to examples of identifiers such as name, 
identifying number, symbol, etc.). 
 41 See id. 
 42 47 U.S.C. § 551(a)(2)(A). 
 43 See Muralidhar & Sarathy, supra note 28, at 7–20 (discussing how the disclosure of 
personally identifiable information results from the release of aggregate data regarding 
individual education performance). 
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 The Confidential Information Protection and 
Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002 (“CIPSEA”) 
defines “identifiable form” as “any 
representation of information that permits the 
identity of the respondent to whom the 
information applies to be reasonably inferred by 
either direct or indirect means.”44  CIPSEA’s 
definition is one of the few that explicitly 
addresses the use of indirect inferences to 
permit identification,45 but it does not indicate 
the scope of effort that is necessary to render 
deidentified data identifiable.  Further 
explication would presumably require parsing 
the meaning of “reasonably.” 
 
 Canada’s Personal Information Protection and 
Electronic Documents Act (“PIPEDA”) defines 
“personal information” as “information about an 
identifiable individual.”46  Thus, PIPEDA offers 
no standard for determining identifiability or 
anonymity, nor does it address the issue of 
reidentification.  A treatise on PIPEDA suggests 
that truly anonymous information does not 
qualify for protection under the statute.47  It also 
suggests that “caution should be exercised in 
determining what is truly ‘anonymous’ 
information since the availability of external 
 
 44 Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act (CIPSEA) of 
2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501. 
 45 Compare The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a, and Personal Information 
Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, § 2(1) (Can.), available at 
http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2000-c-5/latest/sc-2000-c-5.html (defining 
“personal information” without explicitly addressing information that indirectly permits 
personal identification), with Confidential Information Protection and Statistical 
Efficiency Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501. 
 46 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c. 5, § 
2(1) (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/sc-2000-c-5/latest/sc-2000-
c-5.html. 
 47 STEPHANIE PERRIN, ET AL., THE PERSONAL INFORMATION PROTECTION AND 
ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTS ACT: AN ANNOTATED GUIDE (2001). 
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information in automated format may facilitate 
the reidentification of information that has been 
made anonymous.”48  That advice may be 
helpful, but the statute itself is silent. 
 
 The European Union (“E.U.”) Data Protection 
Directive defines “personal data” as “any 
information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person,” and it defines an 
identifiable person as “an individual person . . . 
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in 
particular by reference to an identification 
number or to one or more factors specific to his 
physical, physiological, mental, economic, 
cultural or social identity.”49  The task of 
parsing these words for a clear standard is 
helped somewhat by the Directive’s 
Introductory Recital 26, which states that 
privacy rules will not apply to “data rendered 
anonymous in such a way that the data subject is 
no longer identifiable.”50  It also provides that 
“to determine whether a person is identifiable, 
account should be taken of all the means likely 
reasonably to be used either by the controller or 
by any other person to identify the said 
person.”51  Based on the Recital, it seems 
apparent that the Directive uses a 
reasonableness standard to determine whether 
information is sufficiently deidentified to fall 
outside the Directive’s ambit. 
 
 
 48 Id. at 54. 
 49 Council Directive 95/46, art. 2, Directive on the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 
O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? 
uri= CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML. 
 50 Id. at Recital 26. 
 51 Id. 
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A further gloss on the Directive’s meaning of 
“personal data” can be found in an opinion of 
the Article 29 Working Party, an organization 
established under the Directive.52  The opinion 
offers twenty-six pages of detailed and 
interesting explanation of how to establish what 
is and is not personal data, and what is and is 
not identifiable.53  The length of the analysis is 
evidence of the complexity of identifiability 
under current conditions.  The Working Party’s 
conclusion that a determination of anonymity 
depends on the circumstances and calls for a 
case-by-case analysis is further evidence of the 
essential murkiness of the identifiability 
concept.54 
 
 The Alberta Health Information Act defines 
“individually identifying” to mean when a data 
subject “can be readily ascertained from the 
information,”55 and it defines “non-identifying” 
to mean that the identity of the data subject 
“cannot be readily ascertained from the 
information.”56 This appears to limit the 
identifiability inquiry to the information itself.  
Alberta’s data matching law57 regulates the 
creation of individually identifying health 
information by combining individually 
identifying or non-identifying health 
information or other information from two or 
 
 52 See id. at Art. 29 (establishing the Working Party as an independent, advisory 
committee with representatives from each state and the European Union). 
 53 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of 
Personal Data, 01248/07/EN WP 136 (June 20, 2007), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2007/wp136_en.pdf. 
 54 See id. at 21. 
 55 Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5 § 1(p) (Can.), available at http://www. 
qp.alberta.ca/574.cfm?page=H05.cfm&leg_type=Acts&isbncln=9780779739493.  
 56 Id. § 1(r). 
 57 Id. § 68. 
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more electronic databases without the consent of 
the data subjects.58  The data matching 
requirements include submission of a privacy 
impact assessment to the commissioner for 
review and comment.59  The Alberta law 
expressly addresses reidentification activities by 
anyone (at least, anyone using an electronic 
database).60  The Act establishes an 
administrative process rather than a statutory 
standard for determining whether identifiable 
information is at stake. 
In general, statutes and rules that address identifiability and 
deidentification can be grouped roughly into three categories.61  
The first category includes standards that seek to determine 
whether data is sufficiently or potentially identifiable to warrant 
regulation.  The standards can (a) be inward-looking (considering 
only the data);62 (b) be outward-looking (considering other data 
actually or potentially available elsewhere as well as the 
capabilities for reidentification generally available to individuals or 
experts);63 (c) require professional statistical judgment;64 or (d) 
consider the time, effort, or cost required for reidentification.65  
More than one of these standards can apply at the same time.  A 
standard can also reference a reasonableness test, either directly or 
indirectly.66  As is apparent, a multiplicity of standards are 
available in this category.67 
 
 58 Id. § 1(g). 
 59 Id. §§ 70(3), 71(3). 
 60 See id. at § 1(g) (limiting scope of data matching provisions to combinations of 
electronic databases). 
 61 See Robert Gellman, Privacy for Research Data, PUTTING PEOPLE ON THE MAP: 
PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY WITH LINKED SOCIAL-SPATIAL DATA 81, 92 (Nat’l 
Research Council ed., 2007), available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id= 
11865 (reviewing privacy laws in Australia, Britain, Canada, Europe, and the U.S.). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 88–89.  The European Union Data Protection Directive is an example of a 
statute that employs an explicit reasonableness test. See supra notes 49–52 and 
accompanying text.  The British Data Protection Act incorporates a reasonableness test 
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The second category uses an administrative process.  The 
Alberta law calls for administrative privacy review in advance of 
some reidentification activities.68  This type of review may be 
possible in a small jurisdiction, but it would be impractical in a 
larger one. 
The third category is a rule that requires the removal of 
specified data elements.  HIPAA’s health privacy rule is a leading 
example.69  Some of its shortcomings have already been 
discussed.70 
This limited review of statutes and rules suggests the wide 
variance in identifiability standards that can be found.  In most 
cases, the statutes offer alternate word formulas71 that are probably 
casually drafted rather than a carefully considered approach based 
on detailed study or analysis.  Recognition by legislators and 
policy makers of the complexities presented by deidentification of 
personal data has been slow to develop.  Laws badly trail the 
capabilities of modern computers and experts to use the vast pools 
of personal data available today.72  Current technology allows for 
the reidentification of data that most casual observers would have 
thought was adequately deidentified.73 
All existing regulatory approaches suffer from shortcomings.74  
HIPAA’s rule provides greater certainty, but that certainty is 
somewhat misplaced.75  CIPSEA expressly recognizes the 
possibility of reidentification, but it offers little practical 
guidance.76  It might well take years of litigation before any useful 
test emerges, and the result of litigation may not provide enough 
 
implicitly. See UK Data Protection Act, 1998 c. 29, § 1(1), available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/29/contents. 
 67 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 92. 
 68 See id.; see also Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, ch. H-5 §§ 68–72 (Can.). 
 69 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2010). 
 70 See supra pp. 37–38. 
 71 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 92. 
 72 Ohm, supra note 1, at 1706 (“[P]owerful advances in reidentification thwart the 
aims of nearly every privacy law and regulation.”). 
 73 See supra notes 9, 22 and accompanying text. 
 74 Ohm, supra note 1, at 1706. 
 75 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 76 See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
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clarity.  The Alberta administrative process likely will not scale to 
larger jurisdictions or will require a cumbersome bureaucracy.77 
III. CONTRACTUAL SOLUTION 
No legislation can establish meaningful standards for the 
creation of deidentified data that has full value for legitimate 
secondary users.  That objective cannot be reached now and may 
be impossible to achieve generally.  There will always be a 
tradeoff of some sort, involving the degree of identifiability of the 
data, the usability of the data, the privacy of the data subjects, and 
the cost of the deidentification process.78  Technology can 
sometimes lessen these tradeoffs, but it cannot eliminate them all 
the time.79 
What legislation can do, however, is establish a statutory 
framework that will allow the data disclosers and the data 
recipients to agree voluntarily on externally enforceable terms that 
provide privacy protections for the data subjects.  An ordinary 
contract or exchange of data is not likely to consider or give effect 
to the rights of the data subjects, who are rarely if ever parties to 
the transaction.80  The proposed statute defines the terms of data 
disclosure and rights for the data subjects.  The effect is to strike a 
balance between the interests of all parties: the data disclosers, the 
data users, and the data subjects.  That is the main purpose of the 
 
 77 See supra note 57–60 and accompanying text. But see infra Appendix, Personal 
Data Deidentification Act (“PDDA”).  The Alberta law requires the submission of a 
privacy impact assessment to the commissioner for review and comment, which is 
probably only feasible in a smaller jurisdiction because of the level of review required. 
See Health Information Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. H-5 § 70(2).  The PDDA is probably better 
suited to a larger jurisdiction than the Alberta law because it does not require 
administrative review prior to reidentification. See generally infra Appendix, Personal 
Data Deidentification Act. 
 78 See Ohm, supra note 1, at 1751–52 (noting that as data utility increases, privacy 
protection decreases, and technology has yet to eliminate this tradeoff). 
 79 See id. 
 80 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 110.  Since the parties to a data agreement are the 
data discloser and the data recipient, a data subject has difficulty suing for breach of  
contract due to a lack of privity.  However, a data subject may escape the problem of lack 
of privity in some jurisdictions by suing as a third party beneficiary. See id.; see also 
infra notes 112–14 and accompanying text. 
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law proposed here, the Personal Data Deidentification Act 
(“PDDA”).81 
The key definition in the PDDA is potentially identifiable 
personal information (“PI2”).  The definition of PI2 builds on a 
definition of personal information, which is any information about 
an individual, whether it contains a personal identifier or not.82  
Potentially identifiable personal information is any personal 
information without overt identifiers.83  PI2 is a new concept in the 
PDDA, included to cover the wide range of personal information 
without overt identifiers that is likely to be reidentifiable.  Since it 
cannot be known at any time whether information is 
reidentifiable,84 virtually all personal information that is not 
overtly identifiable is PI2.  Aggregate data (as opposed to 
microdata, which is data about an individual)85 is not expressly 
addressed in the proposal, but the proposed contractual solution 
could work just as well for aggregate data that includes the 
possibility of reidentification. 
The core proposal in the legislation is a voluntary data 
agreement, which is a contract between a data discloser and a data 
recipient.86  The PDDA will only apply to those who choose to 
accept its terms and penalties through a data agreement.87  The 
PDDA establishes standards for behavior and proposes civil and 
criminal penalties for violations.88  The data recipients would be 
prohibited from reidentifying or attempting to reidentify any 
potentially identifiable personal information under the threat of 
 
 81 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act, Preamble. 
 82 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 2(6)–(7). 
 83 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 2(7). 
 84 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 85 (“It may not always be easy to predict in advance 
when deidentified data can be linked. . . .  Whether a set of data is identifiable can depend 
on the characteristics of the set itself, on factors wholly external to the set, or on the 
identity of the observer.” (citation omitted)). 
 85 See Linked Social-Spatial Data: Promises and Challenges, in PUTTING PEOPLE ON 
THE MAP: PROTECTING CONFIDENTIALITY WITH LINKED SOCIAL-SPATIAL DATA 7, 11 
(Myron P. Guttman & Paul C. Stern, Nat’l Research Council eds., 2007). 
 86 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 3. 
 87 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 3(a). 
 88 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4–5, 7(a)–(b) (specifying 
civil and criminal penalties). 
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civil and criminal penalties.89  The data recipients would also be 
required to maintain technical, administrative, and other safeguards 
against reidentification.90  In exchange, there are benefits to the 
discloser and recipient.  Some disclosers would benefit from the 
proposed safe harbor provision that offers liability protections to 
those who apply the statute for research activities.91  Recipients 
would benefit by being able to offer potential disclosers more 
assurance that a data transfer will not create liabilities.92  The data 
subjects would benefit from uniform rules, new protections, and 
enforcement methods that are difficult or impossible to find 
today.93 
The proposal would not require all data disclosers and all data 
users to comply with its requirements.  Only those who voluntarily 
choose to reference the PDDA in a contract or equivalent 
document would be subject to its requirements.94  A mandatory 
solution may not be practical.  There appears to be no way to write 
a definition that would encompass all data transfers, and there are 
too many data transfers to expect that one size will fit all.95 
A voluntary approach allows those who want the benefits to 
accept the obligations.  A model for this approach to legislation is 
arbitration.  Laws define, support, and provide for the enforcement 
of arbitration agreements,96 but it is typical for the parties of a 
contract to decide whether they want to make use of arbitration at 
all.97  If they do not, then arbitration laws do not affect their 
activities.98 
 
 89 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(1), 7. 
 90 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4. 
 91 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 6. 
 92 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 6. 
 93 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 110; see also supra Part II. 
 94 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 3(a). 
 95 See supra notes 38–60 and accompanying text. 
 96 See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
97  See, e.g., Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 162 F.3d 101, 111 (D.C. Cir. 
1998) (“It cannot be gainsaid that the submission of a dispute to arbitration is normally a 
voluntary act, either at the time of the dispute or at an earlier time in a contract providing 
for such arbitration.”). 
 98 See id. 
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The discloser who shares data under a data agreement proceeds 
with the knowledge that the recipient has accepted strict limits on 
the data’s use and disclosure, and that these restrictions are 
enforceable by the state and by the data subjects.99  The discloser 
does not have to accept any obligation to police the agreement or 
to act on behalf of the data subjects, other than to report breaches 
of the agreement to a government agency.100  The main benefit to 
the discloser is that criminal liability is capped or eliminated by the 
law.101  Further, the proposal includes a formal safe harbor 
provision, which exempts a discloser from liability for disclosure 
under a data agreement if (1) the recipient is a government agency, 
non-profit organization, or research organization that has not 
reported a breach of a data agreement in the five years prior to date 
of the agreement,102 and (2) the disclosure is for use in research 
(“systematic investigation designed to develop or contribute to 
generalizable knowledge, but does not include marketing 
research”)103 or in a public health activity.104  The purpose of the 
safe harbor provision is to provide encouragement for data sharing 
for beneficial purposes. 
The recipient who seeks data under a data agreement is in a 
better position to ask for data from a discloser because the data 
agreement and the law impose on the recipient defined and 
enforceable limits that protect the privacy of the data subjects.105  
A reluctant source might be encouraged by a would-be recipient to 
share data because of the existence of formal standards and limited 
liability.106  The recipient accepts the limits and the liability as a 
condition of receiving the data.107 
The data subject benefits from disclosure under a data 
agreement because of strong rules prohibiting conduct that could 
 
 99 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4. 
 100 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 5. 
 101 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 7(b). 
 102 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 6(a)(1). 
 103 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 2(10). 
 104 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 6(a)(2). 
 105 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4. 
 106 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4. 
 107 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 3(a). 
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reidentify data.108  The data subject also benefits because the law 
clarifies that the data subject is a third party beneficiary of the data 
agreement.109  This enables an aggrieved data subject to seek 
damages from a negligent party to the data agreement.110  Under 
current law, a data subject may be unable to sue relying upon an 
ordinary contract between a data discloser and a data recipient 
because the data subject is not a party to the contract.111  “The data 
subject lacks privity–an adequate legal relationship–to the contract 
and cannot use the contract to enforce his or her interest.”112  
Today, only in some jurisdictions will the data subject be 
recognized as a third party beneficiary of a data use agreement and 
be able to seek damages.113  In general, however, the requirement 
for privity can be a major obstacle to enforcement of privacy rights 
by the data subjects.114  The proposed law would clarify this issue 
in favor of the data subjects. 
Most of the obligations fall on the data recipient, which is 
appropriate because the recipient obtains new data vulnerable to 
reidentification.  The recipient agrees to: 
1) not reidentify or attempt to reidentify any 
potentially identifiable personal information 
received under [a] data agreement; 
2) take reasonable steps . . . to prevent any . . . 
related party from reidentifying or making an 
attempt to reidentify any potentially identifiable 
personal information . . . received under that data 
agreement; 
 
 108 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4. 
 109 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 8(a). 
 110 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 8(b). 
 111 See Joel Reidenberg, The Privacy Obstacle Course: Hurdling Barriers to 
Transnational Financial Services, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S137, S175 (1992) (citing Brian 
Napier, Contractual Solutions to the Problem of Equivalent Data Protection in 
Transborder Data Flows, Presentation at Conference on Legal Challenges and 
Opportunities Created by the Prolific Growth of Electronic Information Services (Mar. 
27–28, 1990) (paper on file with the Fordham Law Review)). 
 112 Gellman, supra note 61, at 110; see also Reidenberg, supra note 111, at S175. 
 113 See Gellman, supra note 61, at 110. 
 114 See id. 
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3) not further use or disclose any potentially 
identifiable personal information received under 
that data agreement except in accordance with that 
data agreement; 
4) only disclose potentially identifiable personal 
information received under that data agreement to 
another person if the disclosure is allowed by that 
data agreement and if the disclosure is made 
pursuant to that data agreement or another data 
agreement subject to [the] Act; 
5) maintain reasonable physical, administrative, and 
technical safeguards to protect against 
reidentification of potentially identifiable personal 
information received under that data agreement; 
6) inform a potential discloser in writing before 
entering into any data agreement . . . of any actual 
or reasonably likely breaches of other data 
agreements . . . that the recipient entered into during 
the past 10 years.115 
The last requirement provides a self-policing mechanism that 
obliges bad actors to tell others before they can obtain new data.116 
The fourth requirement—that data received under a data use 
agreement only be redisclosed under the original data agreement or 
under a new data agreement subject to the Act—means that there 
must be a chain of trust if data is further disclosed.117  The data 
involved in a data use agreement will always be subject to the 
mandated protections.118  If allowed by the original data use 
agreement, the data recipient can become a data discloser with 
respect to the next recipient, and the protections continue in force 
because a new data use agreement is required.119 
Both the recipient and the discloser must: (1) report any breach 
of a data agreement that the recipient entered into to a national 
 
 115 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(1)–(6). 
 116 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4(7). 
 117 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4(4). 
 118 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 3(a)(1). 
 119 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 4(4). 
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consumer protection/privacy agency and to each other;120 (2) 
publish a notice of the breach prominently on their respective 
public websites;121 and (3) maintain the website notice for two 
years.122  In addition, in the event that either party learns that 
potentially identifiable personal information under their data 
agreement has been reidentified, that party must comply with 
applicable security breach notification laws.123  The proposed law 
does not impose a security breach notification obligation of its 
own.  It references existing obligations.124  It can be anticipated 
that parties to a data agreement will allocate responsibility for 
compliance with breach notification laws among themselves in 
some suitable manner. 
The PDDA includes several carefully tiered criminal penalties 
for violations.  The penalties range from civil penalties for failure 
to report or failure to post,125 to felonies for knowing and willful 
reidentification or attempted reidentification,126 to major felonies 
with the possibility of imprisonment for knowing and willful 
reidentification or attempted reidentification with the intent to sell, 
transfer, or use personal information for commercial advantage, 
personal gain, or malicious harm.127  There is also a felony for 
disclosing PI2 obtained under a data agreement subject to the Act 
in violation of the terms of the agreement.128 
Civil remedies are available to an individual whose PI2 has 
been reidentified against a discloser or recipient who is negligently 
responsible for the reidentification.129  The PDDA specifically 
provides that a data subject is a third party beneficiary of a data 
agreement so that there will be no issue about a lack of standing to 
sue over the contract.130 
 
 120 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(7)(A), 5(1)(A). 
 121 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(7)(B), 5(1)(B). 
 122 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(7)(C), 5(1)(C). 
 123 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(8), 5(2). 
 124 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act §§ 4(8), 5(2). 
 125 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 7(a). 
 126 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 7(b)(2). 
 127 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 7(b)(3). 
 128 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 7(b)(1). 
 129 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 8. 
 130 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 8(a). 
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Other provisions require an appropriate government agency 
with oversight responsibilities for the Act to file a biennial report, 
review the law in five years, and prepare model data agreements.131  
Another provision makes it clear that the PDDA does not change, 
override, or preempt any requirement or obligation established by 
other laws, and does not exempt anyone from complying with 
obligations under any law or rule for the protection of human 
research subjects.132  Finally, the proposed legislation has been 
drafted in a manner that is not directly tied to U.S. law.133  The 
same approach might have value in other jurisdictions. 
CONCLUSION 
The proposed PDDA seeks to strike a balance between the 
need to share deidentified personal information for research and 
other purposes and the inability to guarantee that the information is 
wholly deidentified.  The solution is to allow the data disclosers 
and the data recipients to enter into a voluntary data agreement that 
defines the obligations of the parties, provides greater certainty 
about the potential liabilities, and allows individual data subjects to 
enforce their privacy interests when data has been reidentified.134  
In order to support appropriate sharing, the legislation includes a 
safe harbor provision for a data discloser who shares data for a 
beneficial purpose.135 
Today’s lack of clear definitions, deidentification procedures, 
and legal certainty can impede some useful data sharing.  It can 
also affect the privacy of users when the lack of clarity about 
deidentification results in sharing of identifiable data that could 
have been avoided. 
The proposed approach to the deidentification dilemma faced 
by data processors and policy makers will not solve every problem 
associated with personal data transfers and uses, but it will make 
available a new tool that fairly balances the needs and interests of 
 
 131 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 9. 
 132 See infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act § 10. 
 133 See generally infra Appendix, Personal Data Deidentification Act. 
 134 See supra notes 86, 88–89 and accompanying text. 
 135 See supra notes 91, 102–04 and accompanying text. 
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the data disclosers, the data users, and the data subjects.  The 
solution could be invoked voluntarily by the data disclosers and the 
data recipients.  Its use could also be mandated by regulation or 
legislation seeking to allow broader use of personal data for 
beneficial purposes.  
APPENDIX 
A BILL 
To protect the privacy of potentially identifiable personal 
information by establishing accountability for the use and transfer 
of potentially identifiable personal information.  [Version 4.4] 
SECTION (“SEC.”) 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the “Personal Data Deidentification 
Act.” 
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS. 
As used in this Act: 
(1) DATA AGREEMENT.—The term “data agreement” means a 
contract, memorandum of understanding, data use agreement, or 
similar agreement between a discloser and a recipient relating to 
the use of personal information. 
(2) DATA AGREEMENT SUBJECT TO THIS ACT.—The term 
“data agreement subject to this Act’’ means a data agreement 
between a discloser and a recipient who have entered into an 
agreement described in section 3(a). 
(3) DISCLOSER.—The term “discloser” means a person who 
discloses potentially identifiable personal information to another 
person pursuant to a data agreement subject to this Act. 
(4) OVERT IDENTIFIER.—The term “overt identifier” means 
any personal information that identifies or can readily be used to 
identify a particular individual, and includes a name, address, 
Social Security number, account number, license number, serial 
number, telephone number, electronic mail address, Internet 
protocol address, webpage address, or biometric, that alone or in 
combination with other information identifies or can readily be 
used to identify a particular individual. 
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(5) PERSON.—The term “person” means an individual, 
corporation, company, foundation, association, society, 
partnership, firm, non-profit organization, school, college, or 
university, or a department, agency, or other instrumentality of 
[Federal, State, or local] government. 
(6) PERSONAL INFORMATION.—The term “personal 
information” means information about an individual that may or 
may not include an overt identifier. 
(7) POTENTIALLY IDENTIFIABLE PERSONAL 
INFORMATION.—The term “potentially identifiable personal 
information” means any personal information without any overt 
identifiers. 
(8) PUBLIC WEBSITE.—The term “public website” means a 
facility by which a person displays information to the general 
public on the Internet or any comparable successor technology. 
(9) RECIPIENT.—The term “recipient” means a person who 
receives potentially identifiable personal information from another 
person pursuant to a data agreement subject to this Act. 
(10) RESEARCH.—The term “research” means a systematic 
investigation designed to develop or contribute to generalizable 
knowledge, but does not include marketing research. 
(11) REIDENTIFICATION.—The term “reidentification” means 
linking potentially identifiable personal information to an overt 
identifier belonging or assigned to any living or dead individual. 
SEC. 3. DATA AGREEMENTS. 
(a) AGREEMENTS SUBJECT TO ACT.—A person who enters 
into a data agreement that expressly references this Act by 
including the words “This data agreement is subject to the Personal 
Information Deidentification Procedures Act” or equivalent words, 
or who is required to be subject to this Act by statute or regulation 
for any disclosure or receipt of potentially identifiable personal 
information 
(1) shall be bound by, and subject to, all of the terms of this 
Act with respect to potentially identifiable personal information 
disclosed or received under that data agreement, statute, or 
regulation; and 
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(2) may not terminate, revoke, suspend, or otherwise limit or 
restrict the application of this Act to potentially identifiable 
personal information disclosed or received under that data 
agreement, statute, or regulation. 
(b) ADDITIONAL TERMS PERMITTED.—The parties to a data 
agreement subject to this Act may include additional terms to that 
data agreement that do not limit or undermine the terms required 
by this Act. 
SEC. 4. DUTIES OF RECIPIENT. 
A recipient under a data agreement subject to this Act shall— 
(1) not reidentify or attempt to reidentify any potentially 
identifiable personal information received under that data 
agreement; 
(2) take reasonable steps, including contracts, technical 
measures, or workplace rules, to prevent any employee, agent, 
consultant, contractor, affiliate, subcontractor, or other related 
party from reidentifying or making an attempt to reidentify any 
potentially identifiable personal information that the recipient 
received under that data agreement; 
(3) not further use or disclose any potentially identifiable 
personal information received under the data agreement except in 
accordance with that data agreement; 
(4) only disclose potentially identifiable personal information 
received under that data agreement to another person if the 
disclosure is allowed by that data agreement and if the disclosure is 
made pursuant to that data agreement or another data agreement 
subject to this Act; 
(5) maintain reasonable physical, administrative, and technical 
safeguards to protect against reidentification of potentially 
identifiable personal information received under that data 
agreement; 
(6) inform a potential discloser in writing before entering into 
any data agreement that will be a data agreement subject to this 
Act with the potential discloser of any actual or reasonably likely 
breaches of other data agreements subject to this Act that the 
recipient entered into during the past 10 years; 
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(7) (A) promptly report any breach of a data agreement subject 
to this Act that the recipient entered into to— 
(i) the [National Consumer Protection/Privacy Agency]; and 
(ii) the discloser; 
(B) promptly publish a notice of the breach prominently on the 
recipient’s public website; and 
(C) maintain the notice for two years; and 
(8) in the event that the recipient learns that potentially 
identifiable personal information that the recipient obtained under 
that data agreement has been reidentified, comply with applicable 
[Federal or State] security breach notification laws. 
SEC. 5. DUTIES OF DISCLOSER. 
A discloser under a data agreement subject to this Act shall— 
(1) (A) promptly report any breach of that data agreement to 
the [National Consumer Protection/Privacy Agency]; 
(B) promptly publish a notice of the breach prominently on the 
discloser’s public website; and 
(C) maintain the notice for two years; 
(2) in the event that the discloser learns that any potentially 
identifiable personal information that the discloser disclosed under 
that data agreement has been reidentified, comply with applicable 
[Federal or State] security breach notification laws; and 
(3) in the event that the discloser learns that any potentially 
identifiable personal information disclosed under that data 
agreement has been reidentified or may have been reidentified, 
immediately suspend further disclosures of potentially identifiable 
personal information to the recipient under the data agreement. 
SEC. 6. SAFE HARBOR. 
A discloser who lawfully discloses potentially identifiable 
personal information under a data agreement subject to this Act— 
(1)  to a recipient who is a government agency, non-profit 
organization, or research organization that has not reported a 
breach of a data agreement in the five years prior to the date of the 
agreement, 
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(2) for use in research or in a public health activity, 
shall not be liable under this Act or any other law to an 
individual who is the subject of potentially identifiable personal 
information disclosed pursuant to that data agreement for any 
damage resulting from that disclosure, except in the case of gross 
negligence on the part of the discloser. 
SEC. 7. PENALTIES. 
(a) CIVIL PENALTIES.—A person who fails to report a breach of 
a data agreement subject to this Act, or to post a notice in 
accordance with this Act, shall be subject to a civil penalty of not 
more than [$2,000] in an action brought by the [National 
Consumer Protection/Privacy Agency][Attorney General]. 
(b) FELONY OFFENSES.— 
(1) A recipient, or any employee, agent, consultant, contractor, 
affiliate, subcontractor, or other related party of a recipient, who 
willfully discloses potentially identifiable personal information 
received under a data agreement subject to this Act in violation of 
this Act is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than [ ] or 
imprisoned not more than [ ] years, or both. 
(2) A recipient, or any employee, agent, consultant, contractor, 
affiliate, subcontractor, or other related party of a recipient, who 
willfully reidentifies or attempts to reidentify potentially 
identifiable personal information received under a data agreement 
subject to this Act in violation of this Act is guilty of a felony and 
shall be fined not more than [ ] or imprisoned not more than [ ] 
years, or both. 
(3) A recipient, or any employee, agent, consultant, contractor, 
affiliate, subcontractor, or other related party of a recipient, who 
willfully reidentifies or attempts to reidentify potentially 
identifiable personal information received under a data agreement 
subject to this Act in violation of this Act with the intent to sell, 
transfer, or use personal information obtained under a data 
agreement subject to this Act for commercial advantage, personal 
gain, or malicious harm is guilty of a felony and shall be fined not 
more than [ ] or imprisoned not more than [ ] years, or both. 
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(c) FAILURE TO INFORM OFFENSES.—A person who fails to 
inform a potential discloser in writing before entering into any data 
agreement subject to this Act as required by section 4(8) is guilty 
of a misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than [ ]. 
SEC. 8. CIVIL REMEDIES. 
(a) BENEFICIARIES OF THE AGREEMENT.—An individual who 
is the subject of potentially identifiable personal information that is 
disclosed pursuant to a data agreement subject to this Act shall be a 
third party beneficiary of that data agreement. 
(b) LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF DISCLOSERS AND 
RECIPIENTS.—If a discloser or recipient of potentially identifiable 
personal information pursuant to a data agreement subject to this 
Act fails to exercise reasonable care to prevent the reidentification 
of an individual who is the subject of the information, that 
individual may bring a civil action against the discloser or recipient 
if the individual suffers monetary harm, emotional harm, 
reputational harm, or public embarrassment as a result of such 
reidentification. Any individual entitled to damages under this 
subsection shall recover not less than $1000, and the court may 
award reasonable attorney fees and other reasonable litigation costs 
to an individual who substantially prevails. 
SEC. 9. DUTIES OF [NATIONAL CONSUMER 
PROTECTION/PRIVACY AGENCY]. 
The [National Consumer Protection/Privacy Agency] shall— 
(1) make a biennial report summarizing any activities under 
this Act [to the national legislature] and post the report on its 
public website; 
(2) evaluate the operations of the Act and report to [the 
national legislature] within five years after the date of enactment of 
this Act; and 
(3) Within six months of the date of enactment, publish one or 
more model data agreements. 
SEC. 10. OTHER LAWS. 
Nothing in this Act changes, overrides, or preempts any 
requirement or obligation established by any other law.  Nothing in 
this Act exempts any person from complying with obligations 
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under any applicable law or rule for the protection of human 
research subjects. 
